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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-2176
____________
IN RE: NEZZY ADDERLY,
Petitioner
_____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from
the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to D.C. Crim. No. 06-cr-00548-001)
_____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21
May 23, 2013
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 11, 2013)
____________
OPINION
____________

PER CURIAM
Appellant Nezzy Adderly pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the crime of being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the crime of being an armed career
criminal, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (the “ACCA”). He was sentenced to the
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years, to be followed by a three-year

term of supervised release. We affirmed in United States v. Adderly, 306 Fed. Appx. 766
(3d Cir. 2009).
On July 21, 2009, Adderly filed a motion to vacate sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
He contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for advising him to
plead guilty to being an armed career criminal and for failing to object at sentencing to
the classification; and for advising him to plead guilty and thereby waive the fact-finding
aspect of a trial. He also claimed that his prior state robbery convictions should have
been counted as one for purposes of applying the armed career criminal statute. The
District Court denied the section 2255 motion. See United States v. Adderly, 2010 WL
1047689 (E.D. Pa. March 19, 2010). The court set forth a chart of Adderly’s criminal
convictions, and concluded that Adderly had more than the requisite number of predicate
violent felonies. Adderly, 2010 WL 1047689, at *3. We denied his request for a
certificate of appealability, see C.A. No. 10-1902.
On June 20, 2012, Adderly filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) in his section 2255
proceedings, arguing that the judgment should be reopened because he is not an armed
career criminal under several Supreme Court decisions, Johnson v. United States, 559
U.S. 133 (2010); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); and Begay v. United
States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). In an order entered on August 2, 2012, the District Court
denied the Rule 60(b) motion. Adderly appealed, and we denied his request for a
certificate of appealability on the ground that the Rule 60(b) motion was in reality an
unauthorized second or successive section 2255 motion, see C.A. No. 12-3280.
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On December 12, 2012, Adderly filed a motion to reopen the section 2255
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), in which he again argued that he did not have the required
number of violent felonies to be classified as an armed career criminal. The District
Court denied the motion as untimely and duplicative of the earlier Rule 60(b) motion.
Adderly appealed, and we denied his request for a certificate of appealability, concluding
that reasonable jurists would not find it debatable, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000), that Adderly’s latest Rule 60(b) motion was in reality an unauthorized second or
successive motion to vacate sentence, and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
consider it. See C.A. No. 12-4571.
Meanwhile, on January 4, 2013, Adderly filed an item in the district court titled
“Petition in Support of Raising a Federal Question Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”
In this petition, Adderly argued that the District Court, in making its prior ACCA violent
felonies determination, had failed to apply the categorical or modified categorical
approach as required by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). Had the court done so, Adderly argued, it would have
discovered that his three state robbery convictions pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
3701 were not violent felonies under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Adderly has
now filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court in which he has asked us to order
the District Court to rule on the above “Petition,” which remains pending in the district
court. Adderly claims that he is entitled to a speedy determination of his “Federal
Question” concerning whether the District Court may classify a prior conviction as a
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violent felony under the ACCA without first conducting the categorical or modified
categorical approach analysis. Petition, at 2-3.
We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. Our jurisdiction derives from 28
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” A writ of
mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary situations. See
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). To justify the use of this
extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable right to the
writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired. See Haines v.
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).
Adderly has failed to make the required showing. The “Petition in Support of
Raising a Federal Question” presents the same issue he has tried unsuccessfully to pursue
in his two Rule 60(b) motions, and like his Rule 60(b) motions, it seeks to advance one or
more substantive claims attacking his armed career criminal sentence. It thus qualifies as
second or successive section 2255 motion which cannot proceed in the district court
without prior authorization from a court of appeals. Cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S.
524, 531-33 (2005). See also Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727 (3d Cir. 2004).
Section 2255 of title 28 provides the exclusive basis for jurisdiction over Adderly’s
collateral attack on his conviction and sentence; the federal question jurisdictional statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, does not supply an independent basis for jurisdiction. See Monk v.
Secretary of Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Accordingly, we will not order
the District Court to rule expeditiously on the pending “Petition.”
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For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
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